An IDF reservist's top ten takeaways after returning from Gaza

I returned to The Jerusalem Post after being drafted for my second tour of duty in Gaza since the October 7 Massacre -- These are my thoughts on what I've experienced.

By MICHAEL STARR DECEMBER 1, 2024 21:24

Michael Starr reads The Jerusalem Post while in reserve duty in Gaza. (photo credit: MICHAEL STARR)

On Sunday, I returned to The Jerusalem Post after being drafted as an IDF reservist for almost 80 days for my second tour of duty in Gaza since the October 7 Massacre. My anecdotal experience as an infantryman and perspective as a journalist in civilian life has given me a unique perspective on Gaza war issues, familiar and unexplored alike. These ten takeaways from someone who has been in the mud of the battlefield should be considered by policymakers and citizens in which much of the information about the war is second-hand information and hearsay.

1. The IDF is winning, and needs to be allowed to win

Compared to their operations during my first tour at the end of 2023, a sense that Hamas is collapsing has since developed. The terrorist organization once fielded ambush cells that conducted frequent hit-and-run anti-tank missile attacks and ambushes from a wide network of bunkers and tunnels for a guerilla defense in depth strategy.

Almost a year later, Hamas seems unable to operate on a strategic level, even from areas in which its battalions have remained structurally intact or reconstituted from degraded units. This is exemplified by Hamas' inability to launch targeted reprisals for the death of military leaders, or even attempt traditional attacks on Jewish holidays or the anniversaries of October 7.

By and large, they do not operate at night or the light of day, clinging even closer to the low visibility of dawn and dusk, whereas their operatives would once more openly operate in daylight hours due to being able to escape underground after an attack. It appears that their tunnel networks have been greatly compromised, as they have had to travel along roads and weave between buildings.

Their legitimate operations focus on IED and lone sniper attacks rather than using heavier munitions, but a greater focus has been filming any engagement so that they can edit the footage so they can claim to foreign supporters and Israeli citizens that they have destroyed Israeli vehicles. Stealing humanitarian aid has apparently not been enough for some Hamas battalions, as in one case they have resorted to sending plainclothes operatives to loot food and supplies from abandoned IDF positions. Their mortar bombs fall far less accurate than they once were, and we did not encounter any enemy drone activity.

The Netzarim security corridor seems relatively safe, with paved roads, and outposts enjoying electricity provided by power lines. While many soldiers left Gaza positive about the IDF's advancements, the path of victory is long and the journey should not be confused with its destination. Many soldiers have mixed their sense of Hamas's significant degradation with the feeling that the military is being held back from decisive action, entering and leaving areas to allow Hamas to retain territorial control.

Michael Starr serving in Gaza in 2024. (credit: Courtesy)

2. Gaza has suffered heavy damage

The extent of the damage to infrastructure hasn't been completely appreciated by the general public, and Israeli and international leaders will need to develop extensive plans to rebuild the territory. Whole neighborhoods have been leveled during direct combat, the search and destruction of tunnels and booby traps, and the establishment of defensible positions.

If buildings have not been damaged by their proximity to explosives or pocked by suppressive fire, they have had their outer walls shaved away to reveal the possible presence of terrorists. Concrete rubble and trash are strewn along wide fields in the Gaza Strip and will need to be collected and moved before some areas are traversable, let alone livable. The IDF Spokespeople will also need to prepare to explain the extensive damage to civilian infrastructure.

3. Gaza was far from an 'open-air prison'

One of the great shames about the extensive damage to Gazan infrastructure is that it was not the desolate "open-air prison" that it had been advertised as in anti-Israel propaganda.

While there certainly were residents living in desperate conditions, the houses, apartments, and villas that we cleared and took position had a decent and even opulent quality of life. All the homes we saw had televisions, computers, refrigerators, decorations, and food stores in line with an Israeli suburb. Our impression was not one of squalor, but normal conditions.

---

---

In rural areas villas and mansions oversaw sweeping vineyards on one side and a view of the ocean on the other, and in urban areas large schools, restaurants and other facilities. The lost potential and degraded conditions in Gaza make Hamas's decision to attack Israel and weaponize their territory rather than develop what they held a shame all the greater.

4. Hamas weaponized Gaza

Much has been said about Hamas's use of civilians as shields to deter IDF operations -- A detained civilian told our troops that he was unable to travel from the North to South along humanitarian corridors because he had to bribe Hamas operatives who were bent on keeping civilians around them as cover. Yet the civilians are just one aspect of Hamas turning Gaza into a weapon to try to destroy Israel.

Tunnel networks are not just placed around or under civilian objects, terrorist infrastructure is integrated into civilian infrastructure in a way that makes the two indistinguishable. Civilian homes are turned into lookout and reconnaissance outposts, with members of families hired by terrorist organizations to provide intelligence, as was exemplified by the capture of spotters captured by a neighboring battalion. Armories are hidden within houses, to be accessed by plainclothes terrorists when they have the need to shed the veneer of being civilians.

Tunnel entrances can be found in the first floor of apartment buildings, not just in their backyards. Other homes are booby-trapped, leading to widespread suspicion of each home as being laced with explosives. With Gaza being weaponized in such a fashion, it has led military units to take precautions and actions that damage buildings and homes so that they can stay alive.

5. The IDF is not conducting a genocide

The purpose of our operations were not geared toward the elimination of Gazan civilians. There were never orders to kill civilians wantonly, and there were debates on if we had enough information to use deadly force and when it was legitimate to open fire. Civilians were allowed to pass by our positions along humanitarian corridors unmolested. These elements would not be found among a force that is devoted to mass murder or genocide. Civilian casualties are tragic, and unfortunately, they always occur in war, which is why such conflict should be avoided in the first place.

6. The IDF needs to restore discipline

While IDF soldiers are not engaged in mass war crimes or genocide, there is inappropriate and even criminal behavior. Other soldiers have shared with me stories of when they have seen looting, and I had to stop someone who had been temporarily attached to our battalion from taking a necklace from a house. While my battalion did not bring our cellphones into Gaza until our last week, when we were moved back to a rearguard outpost, we have seen the widespread use of phones by other neighboring units.

This is all the more shocking not just because posting on social media can be used by enemies to geo-locate positions and gather intelligence, but the violent machismo and inappropriate fooling around in videos and photographs discredits the moral legitimacy of the military and creates an overly relaxed and familiar environment that can get people killed. While journalists have to answer to the IDF censor, it felt to many of us that the IDF has done little to crack down on soldiers who are acting as poor spokespeople and even documenting what appear to be crimes.

Even small issues such as unsanctioned edgy uniform patches lead to a breakdown in discipline, which may lead to even greater behavior unbecoming of the IDF's ethics. IDF leadership seems unwilling to want to deal with the overly involved families and loss of manpower that comes with disciplining inappropriate behavior.

7. Trust has been eroded in military leadership

The failures of the October 7 Massacre have led to a distrust of military brass among many soldiers and reservists that I have spoken to. It has become a common refrain among the ranks to not trust anyone above the rank of a battalion commander.

High-ranking officers are viewed critically as out-of-touch "October 6" officers who care more about the advancement of their careers through checking task boxes on their clipboards rather than actually changing the reality on the ground.

Reservists and mandatory soldiers alike are results-oriented, and if they feel that officers are more focused on satisfying their superiors rather than the realities on the ground, their orders will have less validity. Military brass, like the political leadership, need to prove to their men that their sacrifices for victory will not be in vain.

8. Reservists are frustrated with domestic squabbles

As news broke that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had fired Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, fierce debate broke out in the company about the legitimacy of the move. While Netanyahu's camp claimed that there were professional differences over strategy that could not be overcome, and that the prosecution of the war required Gallant's firing, too much suspicion and bad blood had been developed about political plays within the current government.

Many believe that the move was done to save the coalition because ultra-orthodox parties threatened to leave because of Gallant's work towards drafting haredi youth. Such suspicions have been informed by some politicians continuing to pursue their prior political interests, such as major judicial reform proponents calling to renew the process.

While Israeli soldiers are fighting and dying, they don't feel that politicians are with them and take the war seriously. This distrust extends to the opposition as well -- with many of the same actors that were involved in the anti-reform camp pushing for hostage deals at varying cost, many soldiers have expressed to me that they can't help to wonder if they are motivated by the good of the nation or their own political agendas.

9. The IDF needs more soldiers

As the war and debate about who has drafted has continued, reservists have become increasingly frustrated that some demographic groups are benefitting from the blood and toil of reservists while not contributing to the endeavor themselves. My battalion deputy commander and company commander have become involved in movements calling for a more equal draft.

The need for an increased draft comes as current reservists face multiple tours and are pushed off retirement. Our battalion saw a drop off in reenlistment as some reservists had to deal with crumbling families, businesses, and health. Many reservists came despite these challenges -- the sacrifices that they have made are beyond just the risk of death and injury.

10. Soldiers deserve victory

The sacrifices that were made by reservists and mandatory soldiers were made under the implicit promise that they would be in exchange for victory. The state has to consider in its policies and strategic decisions not just the feelings of hostage families and residents who have to return home but also those who have willingly given everything for them and the state.

Reservists want resolution to the problems that led to October 7, they don't want this war to become yet another round in ongoing conflict. While we will continue to fight for Israel, we don't want to have to come back to Gaza and Lebanon in a few years time -- for not just our sake, but also for that of all Israelis and Palestinians.