Assad falls and Khamenei wobbles: will events in Syria lead to something similar in Iran?

The fall of Assad may trigger a dynamic of internal unrest that challenges the regime more than anything has in the past. 

By HERB KEINON DECEMBER 9, 2024 20:32

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei meets with overthrown Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, in Tehran, Iran May 30, 2024. (photo credit: VIA REUTERS)

“Hezbollah is the victor,” Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei posted on X on September 25, a week after beepers and walkie-talkies exploded in the hands of Hezbollah operatives across Lebanon, in what will surely go down as one of the most off-the-mark social media posts of all time.

He added absurdity to arrogance  when, a few hours later, he posted again: “The Resistance Front and the Hezbollah Front will be the ultimate victors in this battle.”

Two days later, Hezbollah’s leader, and Khamenei’s prized protégé, Hassan Nasrallah, was assassinated. Just over two months after that, Syrian President Bashar Assad, the linchpin of Iran’s so-called Resistance Front, fled to Russia, his regime in ruins.

Talk about social media posts that did not age well.

In the avalanche of  post-mortems since the Assad regime’s collapse -- the ones that list the winners and losers from this development -- Iran tops the list, followed by Hezbollah. Russia, which had propped up Assad no less than Iran but whose investment in the country and Hezbollah was not nearly as great as that of Iran, was a close third.

People gather at the where Lebanon's Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah was killed, in Beirut, November 30, 2024 (credit: REUTERS/THAIER AL-SUDANI)

A staggering loss

Iran’s loss is staggering. Assad’s fall toppled the crown jewel of the arc of resistance that Iran spent over 35 years constructing as a counterbalance to Israel and American influence in the region. The removal of this cornerstone has effectively dismantled the arc.

Sure, the Houthis still remain, as do the Iraqi militias, and a vastly weakened Hezbollah, but what was once a unified axis of resistance has devolved into a collection of loosely aligned forces.  The cohesion, strategic utility, and ideological power that once defined Iran’s regional proxy network have all but evaporated.

That Iran’s ability to project power in the region has been reduced tremendously, that its hegemonic designs have been set back light years, is clear for everyone. The loss of Iran’s regional influence could embolden domestic opposition groups as well. This all has to do with the impact the fall of Assad has had on Iran’s foreign policies. But what about internal developments? What impact, if any, will the fall of Assad have on internal Iranian developments?

Yes, Assad’s fall represents a significant strategic setback for Iran, but not only that. It is also likely to have a huge domestic impact as well.

Assad was hated by millions of his countrymen, who celebrated his fall. Likewise, Khamenei is hated by millions of his countrymen. Could Assad’s fall send shockwaves that will impact the rule of the Ayatollahs?

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While it is premature to say that the developments in Syria will have a domino effect in Iran -- Iran is a much bigger country with a strong army and internal security service, and the opposition forces there remain fractured and lack central leadership -- at the very least, what happened in Syria will certainly boost the morale of the country’s opposition forces, who may conclude that if Assad can fall, so can Khamenei.

Further, the lightning manner in which a regime that was in power for decades fell could serve as a powerful inspiration for Iranians seeking change in their country. Just as many Syrians thought it could never be done, so too many Iranians cannot imagine the reign of the Ayatollahs falling. The events in Syria over the last 10 days could give them hope.

The return of Trump

The changing regional dynamic, together with the return of President-elect Donald Trump in a little more than a month, could further complicate the domestic situation for the Iranian government.

Increased international pressure could exacerbate an already very difficult economic situation, fueling greater domestic discontent. The loss of Syria further complicates Iran’s economic situation as the loss of ports on the Syrian coast, and strategic trade routes through Syria, is a serious hit to the economy.

Iran invested billions in Syria, including oil and gas infrastructure, telecommunications, and reconstruction projects. That is now money thrown down the drain. In addition, Iran provided Syria with much of its oil, and Assad’s fall could have a significant impact on Iran’s oil revenues. The loss of economic concessions in Syria will be a significant blow to an already reeling economy.

Furthermore, the collapse of a long-standing authoritarian ally like Assad will highlight the potential vulnerability of Iran’s government - a perception that could encourage Iranians to view their leaders as more susceptible to pressure than in the past. The blows that Iran took at Israel’s hands, and its inability to prevent Assad’s fall, also present the regime to its people as weak.

The events in Syria could very well reinvigorate the Iranian opposition, which has been relatively quiet since the so-called hijab protests in 2022. The fall of Assad may be seen as proof that with more effort and help from outside forces, even entrenched authoritarian regimes like those in Iran can be unseated.

Iran has a history of protests triggered by various factors, including economic problems, political issues, and concerns over water. The country’s current setbacks -- the population seeing that billions of dollars Iran has invested in its proxy projects are going up in smoke -- could fuel anger leading to more unrest. Even before Hamas was defeated, Hezbollah decapitated, and Assad fell, Iranian protestors chanted about how their money was being wasted on projects abroad. 

This is also something that Iran’s leaders know well, which is why Iran’s leaders are likely to double down in their efforts to keep a lid on any bubbling unrest.

This being the case, the Iranian regime may respond in a number of various ways.

One way would be to increase repression to prevent any Syrian-inspired uprisings. Another possibility would be to offer some superficial reforms or concessions to try and appease potential protestors.

The third and most dangerous scenario, from an Israeli perspective, would be a rapid push toward nuclear weapons. Feeling the walls closing in, Tehran might conclude that only a nuclear deterrent could secure the regime’s survival. However,  Iran’s leaders - which following the Israeli attack there in October is more penetrable than ever before - surely realize that such a move could prompt a devastating Israeli strike. 

The fall of Assad—by undermining Iran’s regional power, delivering another economic hit, and inspiring its opposition—may trigger a dynamic of internal unrest that challenges the regime more than anything has in the past. 

“Hezbollah is the victor,” Khamenei wrote on September 25. Doubtful if even he believes that today.