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The most likely impact of the two ceasefires is for all parties to avoid returning to war. The risk of one blown ceasefire leading to another will weigh heavily on their minds.
By YONAH JEREMY BOB JANUARY 19, 2025 18:46 Updated: JANUARY 19, 2025 18:54
Hamas terrorists parade as they prepare to hand over hostages kidnapped during the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas, to the Red Cross as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Gaza City, January 19, 2025.
(photo credit: REUTERS/DAWOUD ABU ALKAS)
As the Israel-Hamas ceasefire kicked into effect on Sunday (three hours late due to Hamas shenanigans), the 60-day ceasefire with Hezbollah signed on November 27 was set to expire early next week on January 27.
What impact will the two ceasefires, whether violations or compliance, have on each other?
At press time, Israel is somewhat up against the wall, being the sole party arguing that it has a right and need to remain in parts of southern Lebanon beyond the 60-day deadline due to the slow and uneven speed of the Lebanese army taking up Hezbollah positions and preventing the Lebanese terror group from retrieving its weaponry.
Israel has repeatedly said it might need to stay extra time, maybe even another 30 days, to ensure the Lebanese army does its job.
While the US was initially sympathetic to Israeli complaints and did put more pressure on the Lebanese army to comply faster, the bottom line is both Biden and Trump administration officials have said they still want the IDF out on day 60.
Of course, Hezbollah has threatened to restart the war and fire rockets into Israel if the IDF overstays the 60th day, and the UN and France have said Israel must withdraw, largely ignoring whether the Lebanese army and Hezbollah are in compliance with the deal even more than the US.
All of this bodes poorly for how well the Hamas deal will be enforced.
It is not that Israel will not be tough with enforcement on a day-to-day tactical level.
The IDF was actually very tough with Hezbollah from day one about even the smallest violations of the ceasefire deal, killing close to 50 Hezbollah forces in a short period of time during the ceasefire.
But all of this is what the IDF could manage during the “life” of the 60-day period when Israel is “supposed” to still be in southern Lebanon.
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How well will the IDF really be able to stop Hezbollah violations of reconstituting its forces in southern Lebanon, especially those done very gradually and clandestinely, once all the soldiers have pulled out?
It will still be able to carry out drone strikes and limited ground forces attacks from a distance, but there is only so much one can catch without boots on the ground, and Hezbollah will have all the time and multiple chances it needs to eventually figure out ways to slip its forces into southern Lebanon.
All of the above may play out similarly in Gaza.
The IDF will likely fire on Hamas forces, which try to abuse the ceasefire to start rearming or to attempt an ambush on Israeli forces, but this will only solve the day-to-day tactical and temporary issue.
In 42 days, all Israeli soldiers are supposed to be on the outskirts of Gaza, and not long after that, they may withdraw completely to the October 7, 2023, border lines.
This realization is likely to make it that much easier for Hamas to simply wait for the IDF out until the military is no longer in a position to prevent Hamas from starting to restore its power.
There is an advantage that Israel has over Hamas that it does not have over Hezbollah.
Theoretically, the IDF, regional Sunni allies, and the West could empower the Palestinian Authority to retake control of Gaza over time from Hamas. This might or might not work, but in Lebanon, there seems close to zero chance that anyone is even trying to oust Hezbollah from controlling the country, even as the new president and prime minister were not Hezbollah books.
Simply put, Hezbollah and Lebanon know how to rebuild their country without having to give in to too many external power dictates. Hamas may also maneuver cleverly enough to avoid dictates but may at least need to play the game of allowing others into their affairs because they have known sources of rebuilding funds without Israel, Sunni moderates, and the West playing ball.
More explosive scenarios could include Hezbollah restarting its war with Israel. This could put additional pressure on Israel not to press Hamas too hard, lest the situation also return to war.
In around 42 days, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may decide to return to war with Hamas, and this could have unpredictable impacts on the stability of the ceasefire with Hezbollah.
Overall, though, the most likely parallel impact of the two ceasefires is for all parties involved to avoid returning to war.
All parties are tired, and the risk of one blown ceasefire leading to another blown ceasefire will weigh heavily on their minds.
The question will be whether Israel will maintain sufficient readiness to undertake limited and unilateral military action against ceasefire violations so those violations by Hezbollah or Hamas do not balloon into restoring the threat in the North or the South to where it was before this 15-month war.
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