How will Hezbollah factor into Lebanon’s future?

The best that Israel can hope for in the short term is to push Hezbollah’s armed forces far enough from the border to allow the displaced Israeli families of the North to return to their homes. 

By NEVILLE TELLER NOVEMBER 19, 2024 01:17

A MAN takes a photo as smoke billows in Beirut’s suburbs, where the Hezbollah stronghold was located, after an Israeli strike on Sunday. No doubt Israel would like to see Hezbollah completely removed as a military presence in Lebanon and its dominance within the nation’s politics, says the writer. (photo credit: Mohammed Yassin/Reuters)

No doubt Israel would ideally like to see Hezbollah completely removed as a military presence in Lebanon, and its dominance within the nation’s political life ended. Neither seems fully achievable in the present circumstances. 

Hezbollah is a significant presence within Lebanon. Its military strength and capabilities are larger and more powerful than Lebanon’s armed forces. It draws popular support from its vast network of schools, clinics, youth programs, and other social services. 

Financed partly by Iran, it is also funded by sympathetic Lebanese business interests, by the business enterprises that it runs itself, and via the financial institutions that launder the money it earns from organized criminal activities, including narcotics trafficking and counterfeiting European currency.

Politically, also, it is a force to be reckoned with. The group has participated in Lebanese elections since 1992. It entered the cabinet for the first time in 2005 and has held seats in each Lebanese government since. The situation in which current government is an interim one, and the country lacks a president, is very largely, though not entirely, the result of Hezbollah manipulation. Although Israeli policymakers want to clip Hezbollah’s political wings, they know better than to become entangled in the arcane complexities of Lebanon’s political system. 

In any case, there is every sign that the Lebanese themselves are becoming disillusioned with Hezbollah. An Arab Barometer survey published in September found that 70% of the Lebanese population does not trust Hezbollah, and the 30% who do are almost entirely Shi’ite citizens. Only 9% of Sunnis and Druze, and just 6% of Christians have any trust in Hezbollah.

The best that Israel can hope for in the short term is to push Hezbollah’s armed forces far enough from the border to allow the displaced Israeli families of the North to return to their homes. 

A Hezbollah patch is seen as the Lebanese flag flutters over the Litani River (illustrative) (credit: REUTERS/MOHAMED AZAKIR, SHUTTERSTOCK)

Until the Litani?

LEBANON’S LITANI river runs north to south through the country, then takes a sharp turn toward the Mediterranean sea. Hezbollah operates from the territory between the river and Israel’s northern border, known as the Blue Line. Varying in width between 6 and 28 km., it also houses 10,000 UNIFIL troops engaged in ineffective attempts to control an openly defiant Hezbollah.

A word about the Blue Line: Since Lebanon never signed a peace treaty with Israel after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, no international border separating them has ever been agreed. In 2000, however, a demarcation line was drawn by the UN to confirm Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon following the 1978 and 1982 conflicts. 

Along certain sections, UNIFIL has marked the position of the line on the ground with blue barrels – more than 270 of them – giving rise to the “Blue Line” designation. Stretching for about 120 km. from the Mediterranean coast in the west up to the Golan Heights in the east, it has been serving as a de facto border. 

On October 30, Lebanon’s MTV website reported that intensive ceasefire talks had been taking place led by Amos Hochstein, US President Joe Biden’s special envoy to Lebanon. As a result, the website claimed, Hezbollah had agreed to move all its weapons to north of the Litani and establish a demilitarized zone in the area south of the river. 

---

---

It also claimed that Hezbollah was no longer insisting on being directly connected to events in Gaza. The group’s late leader, Hassan Nasrallah, had insisted that Hezbollah’s assault on Israel was in support of Hamas, and that a ceasefire in Lebanon would be tied to a ceasefire in Gaza.

Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri is reported to have insisted that the terms of UN Resolution 1701 must be the basis of any agreement: “It’s out of the question to change the wording of UN Resolution 1701 even by one word,” he said. Hochstein has been traveling between Lebanon and Israel seeking an agreement that abides by the resolution.

Adopted unanimously in 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 notably does not mention Hezbollah. It refers directly only to the two UN member states, Lebanon and Israel, maintaining the fiction that Lebanon is in a position to control rogue militias operating within its sovereign territory. In the UN’s fantasy world, the Lebanese government can order Hezbollah to stop attacking Israel and enforce its order. 

So the resolution calls for all armed groups in Lebanon to be disarmed, maintaining that the only armed force in the country must be that of the Lebanese state. As for an agreed border between Israel and Lebanon, the resolution says that ultimately it is up to the states concerned to determine its exact path but that in the interim the Blue Line must be respected. UNIFIL was charged with ensuring compliance.

THAT, OF course, was where the well-intentioned resolution failed. Like the Lebanese government, UNIFIL found itself impotent against the rampant Hezbollah military machine. Starting on October 8, 2023, Hezbollah started firing missiles indiscriminately into Israel. With tens of thousands of residents being evacuated from their homes, the least Israel could do was to try to deter Hezbollah by meeting fire with fire.

At the same time, Israel began effectively weakening both Hezbollah and Hamas by eliminating its leaders, destroying its command and control centers, and depleting its manpower. Now, with the whole of Hezbollah’s senior command structure, including its long-time leader Nasrallah, removed, the organization may well be prepared to negotiate a deal. 

Hochstein must have been heartened to receive a call from president-elect Donald Trump on November 8. Israeli media, quoting a Lebanese MTV channel report, said Trump told him: “Go and finish your work and make a deal with Lebanon.”

On November 11, the media reported that Israel’s Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer had flown to the US for talks with senior White House officials regarding a Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire deal. Washington officials had already confirmed that there had been progress in the Hochstein-led discussions. “The chances are increasing for a settlement in Lebanon,” they told Ynet.

Then, on November 13, The Washington Post reported that Trump and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, had been told by one of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s close aides that Israel is intent on finalizing a ceasefire deal in Lebanon. The idea is to provide an early foreign policy win to the president-elect as he assumes office. Two days later, sure enough, Reuters reported that the US ambassador to Lebanon, Lisa Johnson, had submitted a draft truce proposal to Lebanon’s speaker Berri.

As the saying goes: “Half a loaf is better than no bread.” If the half-loaf includes an end to Hezbollah’s missiles and its troops being removed north of the Litani River, then it is a compromise worth accepting.

The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com