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It was expected that modern technology would allow Israel to rely solely on counter-guerrilla and counter-terrorism capabilities, leading the IDF to mistakenly downgrade its ground forces.
By Yaakov Lappin, JNS
The Israel Defense Forces and the Defense Ministry must soon make significant decisions about the future structure and capabilities of the military, prompted by lessons learned from the war it has fought since Oct. 7, 2023, and the changing threat landscape.
In the coming months, the IDF will have to propose a multi-year force-building plan, which needs to receive government budgetary commitment to be implemented, to replace the previous plan, Momentum, which began in 2020 and continued until the war broke out.
Momentum helped establish a network-centered war machine, in which IDF branches cooperated to quickly detect and fire on enemy targets. Momentum argued that seizing enemy territory isn’t the most important thing, placing the emphasis instead on destroying enemy capabilities.
Eado Hecht, a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and an analyst specializing in military theory and military history, told JNS there are several lessons for the IDF to learn from the war.
“Starting about 30 years ago, the IDF adopted an incorrect theory of future wars based on an incorrect appraisal of the direction of international politics in general and in the Middle East in particular,” Hecht said.
This mistaken assessment was a local version of “the end of history fallacy,” he added, the expectation that major wars and conflicts were a relic of history.
Instead, the expectation was that modern technology and revolutions in warfare would enable Israel to make do “with only counter-guerilla, counter-terrorism capabilities,” and that hi-tech intelligence and air force capabilities would be sufficient to defeat any threat.
This theory led the IDF to downgrade its ground forces, Hecht noted, leading to a huge reduction in size, in which units were canceled and tens of thousands of personnel discharged from service, alongside the removal of a wide variety of weapon types from use.
“Fields of knowledge necessary to conducting massed ground maneuvers were erased from training regimens,” he said.
“The first lesson of this war is that what became derogatorily known as ‘the old-type wars’ were not old or gone—they still exist and still require the same type of forces they did then and the same type of military theories, doctrine and training they did then. The IDF needs to relearn and rebuild its capability and competence in conducting massed ground forces maneuvers,” said Hecht.
“The second major lesson of the war is that the IDF had reduced its size to a point where it was barely capable of doing what was needed, in fact less than what was needed,” he said.
Two-front wars
While in the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the IDF was able to carry out defensive and offensive operations on two fronts simultaneously, against armies stronger than Hamas and Hezbollah, in the current Swords of Iron war, the IDF could defend on two fronts but only conduct offensive actions on one front at a time, Hecht said.
Even on one front, the IDF had to act sequentially rather than simultaneously attack enemy forces across the board.
“The IDF will have to again increase the size of its ground forces. The answers to the questions ‘How much does it need?’ given the size and character of the future threats, and ‘How much can it expand?’ given the size of Israel’s manpower pool and economy, create a difficult tension that will have to be resolved gradually over the coming years,” said Hecht.
“In my opinion, the IDF needs three more maneuver divisions—but raising them will be very difficult, especially in regard to acquiring the necessary amount of equipment,” he added.
Hecht said that a third lesson is “the need to rebuild the reserves component of the army. The IDF not only reduced their numbers but also deliberately reduced their training—compelling it to retrain many units before employing them because people no longer remembered their skills.”
He highlighted the importance of traditional weaponry, saying the “fourth major lesson is that the weapons of old are still important. During the war, nobody asked for more keyboards and fancy equipment, everybody wanted more tanks, more artillery and more [armored] bulldozers. Some new tools are very useful—especially small drones and quadcopters—and every unit should have them, but they do not change the fundamentals of ground combat. They are an extra capability; they do not replace the veteran capabilities that were reduced because the IDF believed they were no longer needed.”
Finally, he said, Israel will have to adapt to the need to conduct long wars, which require large forces and large ammunition stockpiles, as well as spare parts, accompanied by enhanced wartime production to reduce the dependence on United States aid.
Hecht added that the IDF proved itself highly capable of conducting focused, powerful air-to-ground campaigns, as well as special operations and counter-guerilla operations, but that these do not replace the need for traditional massed ground operations.
Lengthen mandatory service?
On Dec. 5, Army Radio reported that the IDF would be purchasing some 15,000 quadcopters, enlarging its Combat Engineering Corps and creating new infantry units that would have access to advanced armored personnel carriers.
In addition, female field observation soldiers will be armed with personal firearms, as part of changes to the ground forces, and observation posts will be moved away from border areas, following lessons learned from the Oct. 7 surprise assault by Hamas.
The IDF is also seeking to lengthen mandatory service to 36 months for most male soldiers to boost personnel numbers. The report said the ground forces have been conducting force build-up processes already during the war over the past year, aimed at creating a larger and better-equipped ground army.
On Nov. 25, the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Finance announced in a joint statement that the Ministerial Procurement Committee approved billions of shekels in procurement and force-building projects for the IDF.
The acquisitions were made in line with the recommendations of the Nagel Committee, which was established in August 2024 to provide consultations on the security budget and the future of Israeli military force building.
The committee approved several acquisitions, including the Reshef project—the next navy corvette—as well as the acquisition of hundreds of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs).
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