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According to the IDF, controversially, Halevi will not lay specific blame publicly on individual officers in the written reports.
By YONAH JEREMY BOB FEBRUARY 24, 2025 16:50 Updated: FEBRUARY 24, 2025 16:52
IDF troops operate in the Gaza Strip. August 19, 2024.
(photo credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)
The Israeli military will present the lion’s share of its probes into the October 7 massacre between February 25 and March 4, with IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi being replaced by incoming chief Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir on March 5.
Halevi and the military have also called for a state commission of inquiry to address broader issues about Israel’s security failures including decisions by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but the premier has indefinitely postponed such a probe, concerned about its impact on his political standing.
IDF chief to refrain from placing blame on officers' shoulders
According to the IDF, controversially, Halevi will not lay specific blame publicly on individual officers in the written reports.
However, the IDF said that behind the scenes, Halevi is likely to force out certain officers for their role on October 7 if they do not voluntarily step down.
Also, the fate of some officers will be left to incoming IDF chief Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir, given that he will shape the future of the top levels of the IDF.
IDF officials involved in October 7 failure set to resign
Despite the controversy of Halevi not laying specific blame on the written reports, the vast majority of the most deeply involved IDF officials have already resigned or are due to resign soon.
Halevi himself is ending his term 10 months early, given that his minimal term in normal circumstances would have run until January 2026 and could have been extended even a year beyond that.
IDF intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva resigned in August 2024 and was replaced by Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder.
Haliva’s top aides, including the intelligence chiefs of: IDF analysis, Unit 8200 (Israel’s NSA), the Southern Command, and several intelligence aides below them have all previously resigned.
IDF Southern Command Chief Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkleman offered his resignation on January 21, the same day Halevi did, and is merely waiting for Zamir to enter office and choose his replacement.
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Multiple reports have said that Maj. Gen. Yaniv Asur, who was IDF human resources command chief until mid-November will be tapped by Zamir to replace Finkleman.
Asur was passed over for promotion by Halevi, but has been adopted by some right-wing politicians as part of a group of generals who they believe will tie better into their interests, though Asur has never made any explicit public political pronouncements.
The IDF Gaza Division commander also previously resigned.
Will an outside probe investigate Herzi Halevi?
A significant missing piece of the probes will be an outsider probing Halevi himself.
Though Halevi will admit to various errors, initially in January 2024, he had hoped to have an external commission probe him and other top IDF decisions and policies.
Initially the IDF even announced former IDF chief Shaul Mofaz, former IDF intelligence chief Aharon Ze'evi Farkash, and former IDF major general Sami Turgeman and Yoav Har Even would lead the external probe.
However, Netanyahu was so concerned about any probe raising questions and problems which could also implicate him and the cabinet, that he successfully pressed Halevi to drop the external probe idea.
The IDF probes can roughly be broken down into four macro-investigations, which themselves have 18 components to them, and then another 41 smaller probes into individual battles which took place in specific villages on the Gaza border on October 7.
The first main portion of the probes will deal with the national security concepts for handling Gaza, including: the defense strategy, the multi-billion dollar hi-tech border fence, operational concepts, and developing intelligence, especially in understanding Hamas.
Next, the second probe focuses exclusively on intelligence and especially on the estimate of the chances of war by Hamas, studies about Hamas and its capabilities, how intelligence was collected, and how much or little willingness there was within the intelligence establishment to tolerate dissenting views which viewed a Hamas invasion as a real potential threat.
Third, the probes will look at the intelligence and decisions specifically from the evening before the invasion as well as regarding the orders given in light of the evolving threat situation.
Fourth, the probes will focus on the decisions and battles for the day of the invasion and the 72 hours or so after that, during which the IDF gradually retook over the 22 Israeli villages which Hamas initially conquered.
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