Implementation challenges in Lebanon ceasefire agreement

Washington is keen to promote political stabilization measures in Lebanon and to see Christians, Druze, and Sunnis gain more power at Hezbollah’s expense.

By Yaakov Lappin, JNS

As details surface regarding the emerging ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon, and the side agreement reached between Israel and the United States, observers in Israel have flagged potential issues in implementation, saying that Israel’s freedom of operation to act against new Hezbollah threats will be critical.

Brig. Gen. (res.) Hanan Geffen, former commander of Unit 8200 in the Israel Defense Forces Military Intelligence Directorate, told JNS on Monday that “currently the agreement is very general; its framework is very general and those writing it established some supervisory roles—the presence of the U.S. Army plus various elements, together with the Lebanese army.”

Addressing the 60-day initial truce stage of the agreement, during which time the IDF is expected to gradually retreat from Southern Lebanon and Hezbollah moves north of the Litani River, Geffen added: “The 60 days will enable us to see how this is applied in the field; it’s 60 days of ceasefire during which all these mechanisms will be tested.”

He cautioned that “there will be many problems here, because during this period, movement of forces—of the Lebanese army entering and Hezbollah exiting—needs to begin. Hezbollah will make many attempts to evade this, and therefore this is a very critical period for the implementation of the arrangement.”

Geffen assessed that there will likely be “many surprises” during the entire initial truce period, adding, “The assumption is that Hezbollah wants this ceasefire because if it receives it and starts to evade, then this situation will deteriorate.”

Addressing Israel’s freedom of action, Geffen stated that “this is the bigger question: What is this ‘freedom of action?’” He added that “if freedom of action means two days of discussions, then it’s not so much freedom of action, because if you want to respond to an event, you cannot hold discussions.”

He provided the example of the smuggling of powerful weapons into Lebanon, requiring a rapid Israeli response to thwart it.

“Therefore, it opens up many problems in terms of implementation,” said Geffen.

Geffen also touched on undisclosed aspects of the agreement, stating that part of it will apparently be more overt and part more covert.

“I estimate there are parts that only Israel and the United States will know regarding what Israel can do. What is the scope of the American commitments on this matter vis-à-vis Israel? Because this is the most important thing from Israel’s perspective.”

Geffen also assessed that Washington is keen to promote political stabilization measures in Lebanon, and to see Christians, Druze and Sunnis gain more power at Hezbollah’s expense.

“Therefore, it’s worthwhile for the Americans that Israel be satisfied [with how the arrangement is implemented],” he stated.

Addressing Iran’s role, Geffen said that the Islamic Republic is in a strategic bind. “They really have a problem in rehabilitating their status, or at least to maintain their status in Lebanon, because it currently doesn’t look good. On the other hand, let’s not forget that they have a problem with the incoming Trump administration, which complicates their agenda [even further].”

The second Trump administration is likely to adopt far more aggressive positions against Tehran than the Biden administration, said Geffen.

“Therefore, they have a problem with the nuclear issue rising in priority, and the Lebanese one dropping slightly. I estimate that the Iranians will be a bit more limited in their responses in Lebanon, because they will not want to stir up the Lebanese issue at this time.”

While Iran will certainly not give up on Lebanon entirely, because it is an ideological and religious issue for it, the regime in Tehran will balance other priorities, he added.

According to a report by Kan News public broadcaster on Tuesday, a reconciliation call between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and French President Emmanuel Macron helped paved the way for the agreement.

“During the conversation, the French president expressed a ‘more moderate position’ regarding the enforcement of the arrest warrants against the prime minister and [former Defense Minister Yoav] Gallant, which eased the great tension between the two leaders,” said the report.

Speaking prior to this report, Ambassador Alan Baker, director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs and the head of the Global Law Forum, told JNS that Israel had good cause to object to French involvement in the ceasefire-enforcement mechanism.

“France has recently been extremely hostile to Israel, announcing its intention to arrest Netanyahu if he steps onto French soil,” Baker said.

Addressing the arrangement overall, Baker said that it could boost Israeli legitimacy to act in Lebanon, “If the mechanism unambiguously provides for an Israeli prerogative to act in self-defense whenever Hezbollah violates the mechanism. Any such Israeli response would be legitimate in any event, on the basis of the inherent right of self-defense.”

Baker added that as far as he knows, there is a parallel U.S.–Israeli understanding that exists separately to the formal arrangement.

It appears as if some Lebanese politicians prefer to ignore the parallel American–Israeli understanding in their efforts to market the agreement.

Kan News reported on Monday that the deputy speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Elias Bou Saab, said that he hadn’t heard about Israel’s having freedom of action in Lebanon.

“We are talking about Resolution 1701; this decision does not grant Israel freedom of action in Lebanon, and even the committee composed of the United States and France does not have the authority to break Resolution 1701 and allow Israel the possibility to attack in Lebanon,” the report cited Saab as stating.

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