Israel cannot afford to leave Gaza in a vacuum

Editor's Notes: The future of Gaza is a conversation Israel is about to have—whether it wants to or not.

By ZVIKA KLEIN JANUARY 30, 2025 21:42 Updated: JANUARY 30, 2025 21:57

A picture taken from the southern Israeli city of Sderot on October 25, 2023 of the northern Gaza Strip. (photo credit: Ronaldo Schemidt/AFP via Getty Images)

Okay, so what's the elevator pitch? That was my first question to Gidi Grinstein, founder of the Reut Group, as we sat down in my office to discuss his latest diplomatic framework for post-war Gaza. He leaned forward, ready to distill a plan built on months of conversations, negotiations, and calculations.

"Okay, so this is a set of 13 principles that bring together the key demands of all relevant stakeholders in Gaza’s transition—from a ceasefire agreement and hostage deal to the political horizon. It connects the political side with the economic side.

At the core, there is a three to five-year transition period—probably four years- to align with a second Trump administration. This period would see Gaza divided into Area A (~80%) under Palestinian control and Area B (~20%) along the perimeter under Israeli security."

There it was, in a nutshell: Security for Israel, governance for the Palestinians, and an international force to oversee stability and reconstruction. The absence of Area C in Gaza was a critical nuance. Under the Oslo Accords, Area C in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) remains under complete Israeli control. Still, in this plan, all of Gaza remains Palestinian, with security coordination in Area B.

Hamas terrorists and Gazan civilians congregate in Jabalya, northern Gaza Strip. January 30, 2025. (credit: REUTERS/MOHAMMED SALEM)

The legal void 

"Today, Gaza exists in a legal void," Grinstein explained. "Israel withdrew in 2005, and Hamas later canceled the Oslo Accords. Now, Hamas is being removed, but there’s no framework for what replaces it. The key is importing the legal framework that exists in the West Bank into Gaza."

This framework hinges on recognizing the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a 'nascent state'—a political entity that will become a state once conditions are met. It’s a concept familiar to Israelis: "Israel in November 1947 was a nascent state. It became a state in May 1948."

So, will this be enough for the Saudis in order to normalize relations with Israel? I asked. "Perfect is not on the menu," he said, laughing. "But the Saudis need a political horizon. What they get here is the world recognizing the PA as a nascent state, Israel committing to a process toward permanent status without formally agreeing to statehood, and a clear declaration that Israel has no territorial claims in Gaza."

In other words, it is a balancing act: enough for Arab states to engage, enough for Israel to maintain security, and enough to transition Gaza away from Hamas rule.

Grinstein is an Israeli societal entrepreneur and founder of the Reut Group, a strategy and leadership think tank. He played a crucial role in the Israeli-PLO negotiations from 1999 to 2001, serving as Secretary and Coordinator of the Israeli delegation.

He was also instrumental in founding Taglit-Birthright Israel and has authored books on Israeli adaptability and peacemaking. With an extensive background in strategic planning, including economic cooperation projects among Israel, Palestine, and Jordan, Grinstein brings decades of diplomatic experience to the table. 

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The international force

The most significant operational aspect of the plan is the deployment of an international security force led by the UAE.

"The UAE, Saudis, and Egyptians will not enter Gaza unless invited by the Palestinians. Not by Israel. Not by the Americans. Only by the Palestinians. That means a reformed PA must be recognized as the governing body in Area A."

And who exactly will make up this force? According to Grinstein, "The Emiratis have already said they are willing to lead. Other countries may contribute—Europeans, Americans, NATO. Even Indonesia has expressed interest."

But even with an international force, security in Gaza will ultimately have to rely on Palestinian forces.

"Israel can’t run Gaza directly. The cost in blood, money, and global standing would be unsustainable. The alternative—letting Gaza devolve into a failed state—also isn’t viable,” he explained.

Gaza’s reconstruction

One of the more radical proposals, which most Israelis would probably endorse, is the dismantling of UNRWA, the United Nations agency responsible for Palestinian refugees. "Take Jabalia. It’s destroyed. When it’s rebuilt, it shouldn’t be a refugee camp—it should be a permanent community."

Under this plan, UNRWA’s responsibilities, funding, and role would be transferred to a new Gaza Reconstruction Authority controlled by the reformed PA. It’s designed to shift away from refugee perpetuation toward governance and stability.

What about the West Bank? While Gaza is the focal point of his paper, the West Bank remains an inescapable part of the discussion. "This plan is consistent with the Trump Peace Plan,” Grinstein explained. “Gaza and the West Bank are a single territorial unit under Oslo, and that principle remains intact,” he added.

The Palestinian Authority's role in both territories is key. But can Israel trust the PA after years of instability and weak governance? I asked. "Perfect is not on the menu,” he said again. “But what's the alternative? Either Gaza becomes Somalia, or Israel establishes direct control, which would mean billions in costs, international fallout, and unending casualties."

The alternative, he argues, is managed transition.

Grinstein, an Oslo veteran, understands that this plan will be judged in the context of past failures. I grew up demonstrating people like Grinstein, who promoted the Oslo Accords. Oslo was what gave Palestinians guns; what allowed them to kill so many people I knew growing up. So, I asked him: What would Yitzhak Rabin think of his plan?

"Rabin wanted to encircle Israel in a ring of peace—Jordan, Egypt, the Palestinians, Syria, Lebanon. He knew Iran was emerging as Israel’s biggest threat. His urgency was real. If he were here today, he’d see Saudi normalization as a historic opportunity. He would pay the price—lip service to the vision of a Palestinian state—to secure Israel’s place in the region."

Saudi normalization isn’t theoretical anymore. Israel is already part of a military alliance in CENTCOM. When Iran launched missiles, the US, France, the UK, and Jordan stepped in. When the Houthis disrupted the Red Sea trade, Israeli and Western forces retaliated.

Grinstein: "IMEC—the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor—isn't just an idea anymore. It's reality. Rabin would recognize that this regional security architecture is taking shape and lean into it."

Can this actually work? I finally asked. Grinstein isn’t naive about the political realities."These 13 principles capture what’s called the 'zone of possible agreement.' No one gets exactly what they want, but everyone gets something they can live with,” he said.

So, has he pitched it to Israeli officials? He disclosed that "I’m not in the negotiating room. My job is to get as many people as possible to understand the logic of these principles so that they become part of the conversation when decisions are made."

Whether or not this plan will be adopted, one thing is sure: Israel cannot afford to leave Gaza in a vacuum. And as Grinstein put it bluntly, "Israel doesn’t have the capability to create a new legal framework for Gaza. The only way forward is to implement the Interim Agreement."

This is the conversation Israel is about to have—whether it wants to or not. So let’s keep these ideas coming.