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
The bill to alter the composition of the committee responsible for selecting the judicial complaints commissioner was approved on Tuesday for a second and third vote in the Knesset plenum, sparking significant concern within the judicial system, Makor Rishon reported Friday.
The proposed changes include expanding the committee to feature the Justice Minister, Labor Minister, a retired judge selected by the Supreme Court justices, a retired judge selected by the presidents of the district courts, a retired Dayan selected by the chief rabbis, the national public defender, and an MK chosen through a process to be determined by the Knesset Speaker.
At first glance, the proposal to include the rabbinical courts seems reasonable: since the rabbinical courts are part of the judiciary and are overseen by the complaints commissioner, it stands to reason that they should have a say in the selection of the commissioner, just as judges do.
Under existing law, the commissioner is appointed by agreement between the Justice Minister and the Supreme Court President.
The concern within the judicial system stems from the fact that the chief rabbis are influenced by Shas, and in the context of a “full right” coalition, the secular judges fear that the chief rabbis would select a complaints commissioner who caters to the interests of the rabbinical judges while constantly undermining secular judges, particularly politically aligned judges.
A senior official in the court system admitted to Makor Rishon that former Supreme Court President Esther Hayut’s insistence on having the commissioner be a retired Supreme Court justice was a mistake that wrecked the delicate balance of give and take between the justice minister and the court president. The official expressed regret that the system did not reach agreements with Levin when there was still an opportunity to do so. Now, those bridges have been burned irreparably.
The coalition’s main argument is that a public institution cannot effectively audit itself. The auditor must be independent, much the way internal affairs is separate from the police, or how the state comptroller is elected by the Knesset and not the executive branch. When the court president appoints one of his or her fellow judges as commissioner, it’s akin to the IDF relying on an internal investigation to address its serious failure.
It’s highly likely that the law would pass, prompting a petition to the High Court of Justice. If the court invalidates it on the grounds that altering the rules mid-process is prohibited, there would likely be an outcry accusing the court of double standards for striking down a law allowing criticism of the court.
On the other hand, even if the law survives, for the Commissioner to be effective, they need the cooperation of those being audited. If the judges view the commissioner as a coalition lackey, the commissioner may harass them and launch impeachment proceedings against them, but won’t gain the judiciary’s support in improving the system.