The fall of Assad is just the beginning: The struggle for Syria has resumed

The country may have exited the Axis of Resistance, but this does not mean that it has automatically crossed to the opposing camp.

By ELIE PODEH DECEMBER 22, 2024 01:38

THEN-SYRIAN PRESIDENT Bashar al-Assad is cheered by deputies on his arrival in parliament, July 2000. He was formally sworn in after taking the office his late father, Hafez, had held for the previous three decades. (photo credit: REUTERS)

Syria constantly manages to surprise us anew. With the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000, his son Bashar survived against all the odds and contrary to all predictions. At the beginning of the civil war in 2011, most experts wrote him off. Notably, Ehud Barak, then Israel’s defense minister, stated that Assad’s days were numbered. Bashar, of course, survived, albeit largely thanks to the outside help he received from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah.

In contrast to its image as a stable regime, a quick look at the history of Syria shows that before the rise to power of the Alawite Assad dynasty in 1970, it was the least stable country in the Middle East. From 1949 to 1970, it experienced no fewer than 17 military coups, most of which failed. Hafez al-Assad learned from these earlier failures, gaining a clear understanding of the necessary conditions for establishing a lasting dictatorship.

Syria has long been a focus for regional and international tensions, leading the journalist and Assad’s biographer Patrick Seale to refer to the phenomenon as “the struggle for Syria.” Seale argued that whoever wants to control the Middle East from an international perspective, and whoever wants to lead the Arab world, must rule Syria, due to its geostrategic location and importance. While this thesis has not always stood the test of time, the idea of the struggle over Syria as a reflection of a broader struggle in the regional and international arenas remains entirely valid.

After it sided with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, Syria became an important component of the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel. With the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League following its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, it was Syria – not Iran – that led this axis, and strove for “strategic equilibrium” with the Jewish state. However, the 1990 Gulf War and the collapse of his Soviet patron led Hafez to break off relations with Iran, forge new relations with the United States, and enter into negotiations for a peace treaty with Israel.

During the first decade of his rule, Bashar was courted by both sides, which he exploited to further his own interests and those of his regime. Yet the assistance he received from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah during the Arab Spring, which made a decisive contribution to his survival, carried a considerable military, economic, foreign policy, and civilian price tag: reliance on the Axis of Resistance to the point of dependence; the transformation of Syria into a Russian and Iranian base of influence in the Middle East; and the use of its territory as a staging post for supplying Hezbollah, Iran’s most important ally in Lebanon.

Druze people from Israel and Syria use speakers and microphones to communicate across the Syrian-Israel border. July 30, 2024. (credit: REUTERS/RICARDO MORAES)

Not actively fighting Israel

SYRIA HAS not played an active role in the October 7 war, due to the severe consequences of its civil war, though its passive role placed it as part of the Axis of Resistance. However, there were many who hoped that the setbacks suffered by the Axis during the war would lead Bashar to follow his father and switch his military and foreign policy orientation, especially in light of the differences of opinion and concerns recently voiced about a possible Iranian takeover of the country.

The rebels’ assault, then, surprised everyone. They perfectly exploited the moment when Iran and Hezbollah were reeling from major blows inflicted by Israel, while Russia was bogged down in its war in Ukraine and distracted by the political conflict in Georgia. The external actors who saved Assad during the Arab Spring could not save him again this time around.

The problem is that the rebel forces are not a unified bloc. They came together in order to end the Assad regime, but the road to establishing a functioning Syrian national entity will be a long one, because each of the country’s ethnic and religious groups – Sunnis, Kurds, Druze, and Alawites – imagines a Syria in its own image, even if they are all currently united around the new-old Syrian flag (which was the flag of independence from the French Mandate).

There are several scenarios that present themselves in the Syrian arena, with the most optimistic being that the country maintains its recognized borders and establishes a representative government following elections. The pessimistic scenario is that it breaks up into separate entities along ethnic and religious lines. 

Between these two extremes are several more realistic possibilities, ranging from the rise of an Islamist regime of some type or other, to armed conflicts between the different groups. Initial signs of this latter outcome are already visible in the north, with fighting between the Kurds and Turkish-backed rebels.

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FROM A regional perspective, Syria has returned to its natural position in the Arab world. The alliance with Iran since 1980 has been rather unnatural, given that Syria, from its independence, was allied with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Though it was Nasser’s Egypt that promoted Pan-Arabism, the roots of this ideology lie in Syria. Thus, even if Islamist ideology becomes a central feature, Syria will remain an important actor in the Arab world. The removal from power of the Alawites, who are viewed as either infidels or Shi’ites (depending on who is being asked), and the return of Sunni rule means that the alliance with Iran and Hezbollah is no longer relevant.

Israel, of course, has benefited from the changes in Syria, which has ceased to represent a strategic threat for the foreseeable future, due both to the military setbacks it has suffered and to the severe economic consequences of the civil war. Moreover, Syria’s exit from the Axis of Resistance has major regional implications, because the “Shia Crescent” has now been severed, which will make it much more difficult for Iran to transfer arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In addition, the fact that the Axis of Resistance has become a purely Shi’ite axis creates a countering Sunni axis that shares many common interests with Israel.

The change in Syria is not just another regime change in the Middle East. It is significant because it means the renewal of the struggle in and for Syria, between regional and international forces. The country may have exited the Axis of Resistance, but this does not mean that it has automatically crossed to the opposing camp, especially given that Iran and Russia will try to act to maintain their control or influence there. 

On the other hand, the United States is already in contact with the various rebel groups in Syria, and Israel is also not standing idly by. In other words, the struggle for Syria has begun again, with the potential to create new opportunities for Israel and the West.

The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.