3 weeks ago
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Last Friday night, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office issued an unusual press release: Benjamin Netanyahu was convening a late-night meeting with top security chiefs to discuss developments in Syria. The timing was more interesting than the content.
It was after sundown, and Shabbat had begun. Netanyahu, cautious of his religious coalition partners, almost never puts out press releases on Shabbat, especially not for something as routine as a security briefing.
The meeting focused on the rebel assault on the Syrian military in Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city. By Sunday, the drama escalated further when the PMO announced another consultation on Syria, this time involving a select group of senior ministers. Although details were scarce, the underlying message was clear: the situation in Syria was dangerous, but Israelis could rest assured – Netanyahu was watching over them.
This need to present himself as the protector of Israel is a hallmark of Netanyahu’s career. With the fragile ceasefire in Lebanon potentially marking the end of the war with Hezbollah, Netanyahu’s inner circle is increasingly worried about public demand for accountability. Already, calls for a state commission of inquiry are loud and as the wars wind down, they will only increase. By spotlighting the evolving threat from Syria, Netanyahu was doing what he has long done – trying to deflect questions and reinforce his indispensability.
This is not new. In 2009, returning as PM, Netanyahu promised to topple Hamas in Gaza, presenting himself as the leader Israel needed. Over the following years, he redirected attention to Iran and its nuclear ambitions, further solidifying his image as a Israel’s ultimate protector. Now, with Hezbollah temporarily contained, Netanyahu has turned his attention to Syria.
This pivot is needed since Gaza, on its own, does not provide sufficient grounds to justify Netanyahu’s continued dominance of the security agenda. The war there is largely over, even as IDF operations persist in critical areas. Forces remain deployed in northern Gaza, clearing the Jabalia refugee camp; in the south, securing the Philadelphi Corridor to prevent Hamas from smuggling weapons from Egypt; and in central Gaza, maintaining control of the Netzarim Corridor to prevent Hamas redeployment. Despite these ongoing operations, the high-intensity conflict has effectively ended. Hamas has been dealt an unprecedented blow, far surpassing the damage inflicted on Hezbollah in Lebanon, where the Iranian-backed group still retains tens of thousands of rockets and drones.
Yet it was the war in Lebanon that Israel chose to conclude first, a decision that was driven by three primary considerations. First, Israel’s objective in Lebanon was never to eliminate Hezbollah. Such a goal would require a prolonged and large-scale ground war of a kind Israel has not seen before in duration and intensity. Instead, the aim was to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities and clear southern Lebanon, enabling the return of Israeli evacuees to the North.
Second, Lebanon holds greater strategic significance for the international community. The United States and France in particular prioritise stability in Lebanon. In contrast, Gaza’s future is regarded as a lower-tier concern by these global powers.
Third, domestic political and ideological factors played a significant role. Members of Netanyahu’s coalition, such as national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and finance minister Bezalel Smotrich, see the ongoing conflict in Gaza as an opportunity to pursue their ideological goals – the rebuilding of Israeli settlements dismantled during the 2005 unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. For them, ending the war would mean abandoning this vision, as any post-war settlement would require a governing entity other than Israel to assume control of Gaza, likely without an Israeli presence.
As a result, there is little discussion in Israel about the future of Gaza. Critical questions like who will govern, who will rebuild and how Hamas can be prevented from regaining power remain unanswered. The international community, led by the US and Europe, has urged Netanyahu to collaborate with the Palestinian Authority to address these challenges. Netanyahu has resisted, aware that doing so would push Smotrich and Ben-Gvir to topple the coalition. One potential disruptor of this dynamic is the possibility of a hostage deal. Securing the release of all living hostages and the return of the bodies would put pressure on even the most hardline members of Netanyahu’s coalition to agree to a broader plan for Gaza. The government’s reluctance to prioritise a deal is exactly because of this, since the return of the hostages could undermine their efforts to maintain control over Gaza.
While criticism of the government for its apparent inaction on a hostage deal is justified, it is important to recognise that Israel cannot negotiate with itself. Reaching an agreement requires a partner on the other side.
With this as the backdrop, Netanyahu’s focus on Syria provides a convenient distraction. By emphasising the potential for new threats, he succeeds in diverting attention from the standoff in Gaza and the lack of a decisive victory in Lebanon. But this strategy comes at a cost. It skips the urgent need for post-war planning. Without a clear mechanism for governance and reconstruction in Gaza, Israel risks undermining its own long-term security objectives.
Israel’s security policy must be rooted in more than immediate threats and tactical distractions. True security requires a vision for the future that addresses the underlying issues in Gaza, ensures the safe return of hostages and builds a sustainable framework for regional stability.
By moving beyond the politics of fear and focusing on long-term solutions, Israel can chart a course toward real stability.
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