With Trump’s return, will the Abraham Accords make a comeback?

Two months ago, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered his "blessing and curse" speech at the UN—framing the curse as Iran's evil axis and the blessing as the Abraham Accords, which could expand further—he mainly had two countries in mind: Saudi Arabia and Indonesia.

These could have been two strategic, game-changing agreements that would have dealt a significant blow to Iran's plans of imposing a siege and an all-Islamic war against Israel. But the Hamas war temporarily halted both.

Now, Trump and his team are putting these advanced drafts back on the table, shaking off the dust and actively seeking to push them forward.

First in line is Saudi Arabia, the guardian of Islam's holy sites and the world's largest oil exporter. Riyadh's fear and loathing of Iran has led the kingdom over the past year to manage two seemingly contradictory relationships: one with the US and the West, with a wink toward Israel, and another with Russia and Iran, alongside gestures toward the Palestinians.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is torn between two main options: waiting for Trump to resume talks on a full defense alliance with the US, in which case part of Saudi compensation would be normalisation with Israel; or signing a more limited military defense agreement with the US, before Joe Biden leaves office, without requiring normalisation with Israel.

The grand deal would ensure, via a defense alliance, that the US would come to Saudi Arabia's full defense in the event of Iranian threats or attacks. The scenario Saudi Arabia fears most is a severe Iranian strike targeting them in retaliation for Israeli attacks.

In such a deal, the US would provide Saudi Arabia with a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes (theoretically, it could later be used to enrich uranium to military levels), F-35 jets and advanced air defense systems. Saudi Arabia, in turn, would sign a normalisation agreement with Israel, legalising and expanding economic ties and upgrading military and intelligence cooperation that, according to foreign reports, already exists.

The smaller deal would relieve Saudi Arabia of having to normalise relations with Israel, as the latter is unwilling to meet the Saudi demand for practical steps toward establishing a Palestinian state with eastern Jerusalem as its capital. It would reduce cooperation with the US to joint regional military exercises, broader than what currently takes place, and assist Saudi Arabia in fields like cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and drone defense capabilities.

Each of these two agreements has a different American approval process. The smaller deal would likely not require congressional approval, and Biden could proceed with it as he did with the security agreement with Bahrain (announced in September 2023) under his executive powers or by declaring Saudi Arabia a major non-NATO ally.

If Biden tries to push for a smaller deal through Congress, he will encounter difficulties due to the absence of normalisation with Israel. However, a larger deal would require congressional approval in any case.

From Saudi Arabia's perspective, the smaller agreement is not optimal, as it does not guarantee full US protection if Saudi Arabia is attacked. A full, formal defense agreement approved by Congress would, in theory, also bind the next president, Trump. Therefore, Saudi Arabia's inclination right now is to wait for him rather than take a step that might offend him.

On the other hand, the Saudis remember their frustrations with Trump, who did nothing in 2019 when Houthi rebels overcame Saudi Arabia's air defense systems. The Houthis caused significant damage to Aramco's oil facilities in Abqaiq, using dozens of Iranian drones and missiles launched from Yemen.

Saudi Arabia fears a similar retaliatory attack, following Israel's damaging strike on Hodeidah Port in Yemen last September. According to foreign reports, which Saudi Arabia has denied, Israeli jets flew through Saudi airspace during that attack.

The latest indication about the timing and direction Saudi Arabia will choose—a larger or smaller deal—came during an investment conference in Riyadh, where Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud participated.

Prince Faisal made it clear that his country would not recognise Israel without the establishment of a Palestinian state. On this issue, he explained, Saudi Arabia is patient: It will proceed with the US in areas like trade and artificial intelligence, "areas not related to third parties," which can move quickly, while defense cooperation is more complicated.

Meanwhile, at least until Trump takes office, Saudi Arabia is taking precautions against Iran, though not in ways that Israel or the U.S. would approve. Riyadh is getting closer to both Iran and Russia. This is not an ideological shift toward Shia ideology or the clerics in Tehran, but rather about interests.

The Saudis believe this is currently the safer path to prevent Iran or its proxies from attacking them; safer than what they could expect from the outgoing Biden administration, which they have difficulty trusting.

In the spirit of this rapprochement with Iran, Crown Prince Mohammed, who only a little over a year ago declared that "normalisation with Israel is not a question of 'if' but 'when,'" now says Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. He even instructed his UN delegation to vote in favour of granting full membership to the Palestinians.

As part of the security network Saudi Arabia has set up against its real enemy—Iran—foreign ministers from both countries have already met; the Saudi and Iranian military chiefs of staff have held talks, and the countries participated in a joint naval drill.

A US official close to Trump's administration believes this is a temporary, tactical collaboration, and certainly not fundamental. "When circumstances change, and that will happen soon," the official says, "Saudi Arabia will make its choice again. The [ceasefire] deal in Lebanon and the deal Trump wants Israel to secure before entering the White House, also [with Hamas] in the south, will be a major catalyst for such a change."