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Defense Minister Israel Katz has wasted no time leaving his stamp on the cabinet office, viewed as the most powerful in the government.
By YONAH JEREMY BOB FEBRUARY 13, 2025 17:41 Updated: FEBRUARY 13, 2025 17:49
Defense Minister Israel Katz attends a Foreign Affairs and Defense committee discussion at the Knesset, in Jerusalem, on January 22, 2025
(photo credit: YONATAN SINDEL/FLASH90)
Looking back at Defense Minister Israel Katz’s first 100 days, he cannot be as easily dismissed as many in the media have tried to do.
Unlike some new Likud ministers who had little substantive experience or accomplishments and whose main resume was tweeting publicly for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and against all of his perceived opponents, Katz, age 70, has had serious jobs.
He has been foreign minister twice, was transportation minister, invested in significant long-term projects for many years, was finance minister, and was intelligence minister. He has held many other roles, having served in the Knesset since 1998.
However, some of his decisions in his first approximately 100 days in office - dating back to November 7 when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ousted Yoav Gallant due to various loyalty issues – have caught observers by surprise as seeming to be more openly politicizing national security issues in a way that Katz, who again has maintained a profile as a serious minister, had avoided in the past.
The circumstances are unusual.
Gallant had been one of the most independent defense ministers in recent memory, with Netanyahu having decided to fire him twice, in March 2023 and again in September 2024, only to keep him on due to either public outcry or the need to keep Gallant at the defense helm in the midst of a new security crisis.
So Netanyahu was clearly more in need of a defense minister who openly toed the line with him than even in normal circumstances where he might have granted a larger amount of independence.
Katz vs. Halevi
Also, one of the few potential threats to Netanyahu’s ongoing rule (past 17 years as prime minister) has been outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi.
Halevi is both a potential hero-competitor with Netanyahu for credit for the parts of the current war which went well and also uniquely positioned to place contributory blame on the prime minister for the October 7, 2023 disaster.
From November 7 until January 21, when Halevi voluntarily announced he would resign as of March 6, a majority of commentators argued that one of Katz’s primary missions from Netanyahu was to get Halevi out of office.
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Sources close to Katz deny this narrative and say the disputes with Halevi were professional disputes over appointments connected to the October 7 disaster and the improper delay of the publication of the IDF probe into that disaster.
Critics of Katz said his campaign to oust Halevi started with an announcement in late November that he was freezing the promotions of two senior officers which Halevi approved until the IDF chief issued his report about October 7.
Then on December 19, Katz said he was freezing all Halevi appointments until Halevi issued his October 7 report, and demanded it be issued by the end of January.
For a couple of weeks, Katz and Halevi jousted about that timing, with Halevi implying it might take some extra weeks and Katz doubling down on his end of January deadline.
Critics of Katz said that the game was never really about the exact timing of when the IDF October 7 report would go out, but about forcing out Halevi and using the report to blame the IDF for Hamas’s invasion in order to insulate Netanyahu.
They say this became eminently clear when – once Halevi announced he would resign – Katz stopped publicly insisting about the timing of when the IDF October 7 report would come out, and allowed his holy end of January deadline to pass without saying a word.
However, sources close to Katz have said that Halevi announced his resignation and the timing voluntarily based on his own considerations, and that it was necessary for the defense minister to press Halevi about the October 7 probe and related appointments given that the issues had dragged out for months longer than should have occurred.
Critics of Katz have said that the main thing that mattered about timing was that by around March 1 – when Phase I of the hostage deal would be over – Netanyahu would have a more compliant IDF chief in place who would not challenge him about going back to war being a move that would risk the hostages lives – something which Halevi did repeatedly during the war.
But the debate is far more complex than that.
Many top IDF officials, past and present, started to call for Halevi to resign already in June 2024 when it became clear that the military had, or was about to defeat, all 24 of Hamas’s battalions, including in Rafah.
In some narratives, Halevi himself started the process of finishing the IDF probes in June 2024, which had started in March 2024 after the defeat of Hamas in Khan Yunis. In this narrative, he would have put them out and resigned around September 2024, if many field commanders had not protested the Beeri probe in July 2024 and if conflict with Hezbollah had not gotten more serious.
If so, isn’t Katz just helping Halevi out the door, when Halevi knew that, in some scenarios, he should have quit already half-a-year-ago?
Race for IDF chief of staff
One way of evaluating whether Katz acted politically versus Halevi is looking at who he picked to replace him.
Katz’s selection of Eyal Zamir to replace Halevi as the next IDF chief is probably his most impactful decision in office to date.
Despite fears from some that he and Netanyahu might appoint a lower ranked or positioned general with clearer right-wing politics to the post, Zamir was considered a non-partisan appointment and greeted with universal praise.
In fact, the praise was so universal and wide including Israel’s left and center that some right-wing politicians who had initially been excited about Zamir, started to wonder out loud that maybe he might be “too professional” and independent if he was drawing such bipartisan accolades.
It is not that Katz did not influence the process away from the Halevi “click” within the IDF – he did.
IDF Northern Command Chief Maj. Gen. Ori Gordin is one of the heroes of the war, having been responsible for defeating both Hezbollah and Syria’s military capabilities, and most saw him being on the shortlist for the next IDF chief.
Katz did not include him on the list.
In contrast, commentators had not expected former major general Tamir Yadai to be on the list, and Katz had him on the list.
He was a well-respected major general, but was never deputy IDF chief or commander of the all-important northern and southern commands, such that it was hard to see him beating out Zamir, or Gordon, or deputy IDF chief Amir Baram.
Some said Yadai was considered by Katz and Netanyahu to be at odds with Halevi and his group, which made him desirable either as the next chief or the next deputy chief followed by being possibly chief in two rounds.
In contrast, other sources noted that Yadai had held three different positions at the rank of major general, whereas Gordin was only in his second position at that rank.
Sources said that Katz had nothing against Gordin and believes he is very talented and a potential future IDF deputy chief or chief in later rounds of consideration, though at the same time, Katz is certainly not jumping on this option, given that he has asked deputy chief Amir Baram to stay on in that post even after Baram sought to resign twice.
One last point that was noteworthy was that the public announcement of the decision was issued by Netanyahu’s office, even though it mentioned Katz as a secondary partner.
This could have been a message to Zamir about who he should stay close to.
Jewish Israeli administrative detention
Another major series of decisions where Katz stood out was regarding declining administrative detention of all Jewish Israelis across the board, no matter how much the Shin Bet viewed them as violent and dangerous.
Not only did Katz refuse to sign a single administrative detention of Jewish Israelis, something overwhelmingly supported by Netanyahu for 16 of his 17 years in office, but he also issued a blanket release of all existing Jewish administrative detainees on January 17.
Critics of Katz said this move was taken to assuage Finance Minister Betzalel Smotrich at a time when Netanyahu knew that Smotrich was considering toppling the government over the impending hostage deal with Hamas that leaked around that same day.
While some security officials have said that issuing restraining orders to certain extremist activists to stay out of the West Bank and initiating intensive dialogues with religious figures who might moderate some of the young extremists might accomplish what administrative detention once did, a majority of security officials say that blocking administrative detention is a purely political move that endangers security for both Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank.
Other sources said that Katz would still sign on to administrative detention orders in extreme situations, possibly such as if a Palestinian was killed and it was taking time to sort out who the killer was.
The starting point of the conversation seemed to be with sources viewing the Shin Bet as over-using administrative detention against Jewish West Bank residents, given the agency’s position that the Israeli police are not doing their job sufficiently in arresting and probing such persons.
These sources seemed to accept the idea that the police during Itamar Ben Gvir’s era as national security minister have failed to properly do their job in this area but said that the answer could not be just jumping to more administrative detentions.
Rather, it seemed, according to sources, that Katz’s major move regarding administrative detentions was directed at pushing back against what had been one of the largest volumes of administrative detentions since the early days of the State of Israel.
Also, he seemed to want to push back against a perceived trend of it being too easy to place Jewish settlers in administrative detention as opposed to a Jewish extremist from Tel Aviv who is usually arrested.
Security debate
A further move by Katz which stunned the defense establishment was his public rebuke of IDF Intelligence Chief Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder.
Katz demanded that Halevi make Binder apologize for expressing his view that the Trump administration's recommendation to “voluntarily” transfer the Palestinians out of Gaza could cause a spike in terror during Ramadan, which starts on February 28.
However, Binder was not trying to play politics or interject some kind of personal view into the debate, or embarrass Netanyahu with Trump.
Rather, he was expressing behind closed doors the professional view – which should not be unexpected – that Hamas may try to use the Trump Gaza population transfer plan as a way to incite an uptick in violence and noting how the IDF and government should prepare for such a scenario.
Valid questions could be raised about Binder or allied officials if the IDF leaked his warning to the media, but the Post has indications that it is far more likely that ministers who wanted to go after Binder were the ones who leaked his private, professional recommendations to the media.
In fact, until now, there have been few leaks of his presentations to the cabinet since he took office in August 2024.
Most likely, some right-wing cabinet ministers leaked the issue to the media as they wanted him fired given that he was the most senior appointment made by Halevi, and they wanted to root out top Halevi-loyal officials.
Sources supporting Katz declined to address the issue.
Katz could have backed up Binder or remained silent and instead decided to pile on publicly, signaling that at least in the moment that he attacked Binder, he might not have the back of IDF officials who express professional views to the cabinet, even if those views are not meant to be political, if the implications of those views could be bad for Netanyahu’s politics.
On the other hand, the fact that Katz is not defending his conflict on this matter, as sources have defended his conduct on other matters, may suggest he realized he overstepped on the issue and may stay above the fray when similar issues arise in the future.
If this event repeats, it could have a chilling effect on the IDF from issuing critical security warnings, but if it was a one-time event, it might be forgotten.
Security fence with Jordan
Katz does get high marks for promising to move forward speedily with a new serious border fence with Jordan.
This was a goal that his predecessor, Gallant, had tried to achieve progress on and failed.
It is unclear exactly how Katz brought the Finance Ministry on board on this issue, and if it was more his better interpersonal relations with Betzalel Smotrich or merely the timing that the government would not push forward with such a big initiative while it was fighting hard against Hezbollah and Hamas,
But whatever the background, the fact is that Katz got this NIS 5.2 billion project through which Gallant had been unable to move.
Sources said Katz went all-in to make sure that Iran could not smuggle weapons into the West Bank and cause Israel new strategic threats.
Katz on Syria, Jenin, Lebanon
Katz has also been forceful about the IDF flexing its muscles in defending Israel’s borders on a variety of key fronts.
Regarding Syria, he has signaled that Israel could be present in its newly created buffer zone for a very extended period, saying on January 28, that there was no set time limit.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had previously said until the end of 2025.
Since then, sources have said that this open-ended presence could last for years.
Likewise, in the West Bank, Katz has said that IDF soldiers will remain in Jenin even after the current large military operation in northern Samaria, which started on January 21, ends.
Since his previous statement, sources have added that IDF troops may remain in Jenin for several months after the current operation ends.
In Lebanon, Katz recently highlighted the importance of not only keeping Hezbollah out of southern Lebanon even after the IDF withdrawals from all or most of that area, but also keeping Hezbollah drones away from the Israeli border.
He threatened Hezbollah’s leaders that if the drone threat does not disappear, that they will.
Katz will also be a critical actor in addressing the Iranian nuclear threat and the integration of haredim into the military, but these issues, even more than some of the other critical issues, will be overwhelmingly decided by Netanyahu.
It is early to judge what kind of a legacy Katz will leave as a defense minister,
But even in his first 100 days and even as he is avoiding the independent streak which got Gallant into trouble, he has wasted no time leaving his stamp on the cabinet office viewed as the most powerful in the government.
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